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Abstract 
 We estimate the impact of schooling on monthly earnings from 1950 to 2000 in Romania.   
Nearly constant at about 3-4% during the socialist period, the coefficient on schooling in a 
conventional earnings regression rises steadily during the 1990s, reaching 8.5% by 2000.  Our 
analysis finds little evidence for either the standard explanations of such an increase in the West 
(labor supply movements, product demand shifts, technical change) or the transition-specific 
accounts sometimes offered (wage liberalization, border opening, increased quality of 
education).  But we find some support for institutional and organizational explanations, 
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1.  Introduction 
 An increasing number of studies have begun to document the rapid rise in relative 
earnings associated with education in post-communist Eastern Europe (see, e.g., the summary in 
Fleisher, Sabirianova Peter, and Wang, 2004).  Little attention, however, has been paid to the 
schooling premium in Romania, the topic of this paper.  The single available set of previous 
estimates, in a recent article by Skoufias (2003), pertains to only one cross-section of data in the 
early transition year of 1994.  While these results may be compared with those from other 
countries, clearly they are limited in their ability to track the impact of transition, as they contain 
information neither on the pre-transition situation nor on developments as transition progressed 
through the 1990s.  Indeed, many of the studies of earnings differentials in other transition 
economies are similarly limited to cross-sections or very short time series, and relatively few 
have analyzed databases with long series of information both before and after the tumultuous 
changeovers in political-economic system.1 
In this paper, we use data from 1950 to 2000 to estimate the evolution of the wage impact 
of schooling for Romanian workers.  Romania provides a particularly interesting setting in which 
to investigate these issues.  To an even greater extent than in most other transition economies, 
Romania’s economy during the socialist period up to 1990 reflected a thorough system of central 
planning and administrative controls, with none of the partial reforms adopted in Hungary, 
China, or the former Soviet Republics.  Labor issues were strictly under the purview of the State 
Planning Committee, emigration was virtually prohibited, and migration was very strictly 
                                                 1  Brainerd (1998) studies Russia from 1991 to 1994; Chase (1998) contains estimates for 1984 and 1992 in 
Czechoslovakia; for the Czech Republic, Vecernik (1995) studies 1988-1994, Flanagan (1998) studies 1988 and 
1996, and Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell (1999) analyze retrospective data for 1989 and 1991-1996; Kertesi and 
Kollo (2002) and Campos and Jolliffe (2003) both analyze Hungarian data from 1986 to 1998; Sabirianova Peter 
(2003) studies retrospective data for 1985 and 1990, and cross-sections for 1994-2000.  Most similar to the long 
time series we study in this paper is Fleisher and Wang’s (2004) retrospective data in China from 1950 to 1994. 
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controlled, with 10 cities “closed” to new residents.  Base wages were prescribed by the Wage 
Law and varied primarily by industry, occupation, and experience.  Entry into occupations was 
restricted by rigid educational requirements, and incentive payments were small (although not 
uncommon) and, according to most observers, ineffectual.  Workers and managers had only very 
weak incentives to innovate and risked sanctions for stepping outside the plan.  Education was 
also tightly regulated, as each year the plan specified the precise number of new entrants for each 
field.  Consistent with Communist development priorities, the educational system strongly 
emphasized engineering and vocational training relevant to the industrial sector.2 
The breakdown of this closed, inflexible regime at the beginning of the 1990s came 
without warning.  While wages in state bureaucracies, and for a time in state-owned enterprises, 
continued to be prescribed by law, the system was not prepared to deal with changes in corporate 
governance and the sudden growth of new small enterprises.  In the old firms, where explicit 
regulation was replaced by tax-based wage (incomes) policies, there may have been some inertial 
tendency to stick with the wage grid, which was still officially promulgated.  Yet the gradual 
accumulation of effects from privatization and liberalization likely increased the pressure for 
firms to rationalize their wage structures.3  Meanwhile, the Romanian educational system also 
underwent big changes, as higher education was liberalized and enrollments dramatically 
increased (Sapatoru, 2001).  Concurrently with the shift of employment towards trade and 
consumer services, students increasingly shifted from technical fields towards humanities, social 
sciences, and business; and curricula were restructured under the influence of market pressures 
and international norms. 
                                                 2 Kornai (1992) contains a general overview of these aspects of socialist economies, while Ben-Ner and Montias 
(1991) provide some specific discussion on Romania. 
3 Earle (1994), Earle and Oprescu (1995), Earle and Pauna (1996), and Pauna and Pauna (1999) describe Romanian 
labor markets in transition, while Earle and Sapatoru (1993, 1994) and Earle and Telegdy (1998, 2002) analyze 
Romanian privatization policies. 
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This context suggests a set of contrasting hypotheses about the changing wage structure 
in Romania.  On the one hand, the tendency for central planners to undervalue education and to 
compress wage differentials suggests that any earnings premia associated with formal schooling 
would be small under the socialist regime, and they are likely to increase during transition as the 
economy liberalizes and moves to a market equilibrium.  Furthermore, the usefulness of skills 
acquired through schooling might rise during transition because of skill-biased shifts in labor 
demand, improvements in the quality of education, or increases in the “value of the ability to 
deal with disequilibria” (Schultz, 1975).  The opening of international borders, particularly to the 
West, could increase pressure on the educational premium as more educated workers emigrate to 
exploit the higher returns on international markets. 
On the other hand, expanded access to schooling may have led to a skill-biased relative 
supply shift, implying a decreased measured return.  Moreover, the pre-reform educational 
system was designed to further the industrialization priorities of the Communist elite, and the 
value of such schooling might therefore decline in a new market environment.4  The disruptions 
of transition might result in a declining, rather than improving, quality of education, reducing the 
return to recent schooling as well.  Finally, the large sectoral shifts associated with an economy-
wide restructuring process could imply that the return to schooling is influenced by 
compositional effects – in either direction. 
Theoretical considerations alone, therefore, do not provide a single prediction of the 
evolution of schooling differentials across the socialist and transition periods.  In addition to 
providing empirical estimates of these differentials from 40 years before to 10 years after 
transition began, our empirical analysis in this paper exploits information on the nature of 
                                                 4 Flanagan (1998) and Filer, Jurajda, and Planovsky (1999) make this point with respect to the Czech Republic.  
Kertesi and Kollo (2002) argue more generally that skill obsolescence is an important factor in Hungary. 
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Romanian reforms and institutions to try to sort out some of the relevant explanations for the 
patterns we observe.  An examination of the timing of the changes in schooling returns vis-a-vis 
the timing of liberalization helps assess the plausibility of “movement towards equilibrium.”  
Evidence on changes in the quantity of workers with more and less education is useful to assess 
the demand and supply interpretations.  Some information on the importance of pressures arising 
from international border opening can be obtained by examining regional and ethnic differences 
in the schooling premium.  Concerning “dealing with disequilibria,” we separately estimate the 
impact of schooling in the private and self-employment sectors, the loci for entrepreneurial 
behavior in the economy.  The possibility of changing value of the educational system can be 
approached by permitting the estimated return to vary with the time period in which schooling 
was acquired.  Finally, separate estimates of schooling returns by economic sector can, together 
with information on sectoral shifts, predict the counterfactual return in the absence of the shifts.5 
In the next section, we describe our data sources, sample composition, and variables.  
Section 3 contains estimates of the basic earnings functions, while Sections 4 and 5 provide 
evidence on possible explanations of the observed patterns, the former focusing on relative 
supply shifts and movement towards equilibrium and the latter on factors that may have shifted 
relative demand.  The final section gives a brief conclusion. 
2.  Data 
The source of our data is the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) of the Romanian 
National Commission for Statistics (renamed as National Institute of Statistics since 2001).  For 
the socialist years (back to 1950) and early 1990s, our information is based on retrospective 
                                                 5 We follow the previous literature in referring to the coefficient on years of schooling in a conventional earnings 
function as the “return to schooling,” although consideration of issues such as the costs of schooling (monetary and 
psychic), the measurement of the value of a job (i.e., including fringe benefits and other work conditions),  and the 
problems of estimation (for example, selection bias in schooling decisions) suggest that “wage differential 
associated with schooling” would be more cautious and apt, although also clumsier. 
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information in the 1994 survey, while for 1994 onwards we use the annual household survey.  
The IHS started in April 1994, running for 12 months over a changing sample (thus, when we 
refer to “1994 sample,” this means April 1994 to March 1995).  Subsequent years were 
organized on a similar pattern up to 1997, when the IHS started in April and ended in November. 
For the rest of the cross sections (i.e., 1998-2000), the IHS started in January and ran for 12 
months.  Unfortunately, although originally designed as a panel, the data do not permit linking of 
individual observations across years. 
The sample sizes in these data are larger than in most studies of socialist and transition 
economies.  The number of observations available for analysis varies across the cross sections, 
starting at 25,565 in 1994, falling to 15,508 in 1997, increasing to 21,518 in 1998, and 
decreasing again afterwards to 17,480 in 2000.  Given the relatively small number of yearly 
observations before 1994, we aggregate these observations into five 5-year periods (1950-1989) 
and one 4-year period (1990-1993), the latter capturing the initial years of reforms.  
A notable change in the survey across the years for the purpose of this paper is that years 
of schooling are reported directly by respondents only in 1994 and 1995.  In order to estimate the 
return to years of schooling in 1996-2000, we had to impute years associated with educational 
attainment, a frequent procedure in such data sets.  Our method was to compute the median years 
of schooling for each attainment category in 1994, and then to associate these medians with the 
corresponding attainment categories in 1996-2000. 
 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the main variables.  Throughout the paper, 
we provide results for the sample of all employees aged 15-59, but we have also analyzed other 
age ranges (18-59 and 30-50) and separated the sample by gender, obtaining similar results.  The 
net monthly wage is computed as earnings on the primary job in the previous month minus taxes 
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and other mandatory contributions.  The wage variable refers to the previous month in 1994-
2000 and the starting wage for jobs held during 1950-1993.  Questions may be raised about 
recall bias in the retrospective information, but it should be borne in mind that starting wages on 
new jobs are relative easily recalled, particularly in the socialist context of strong stability in 
wages, prices, and employment.  Age bias may also be present, as workers observed to be 
starting jobs in earlier years tend to be systematically younger than those starting later.  All our 
regressions control for age (experience) in quadratic form, and we have also investigated quartics 
with similar results, but these problems might still represent significant limitations if we intended 
a very extensive analysis of the retrospective information.  Most of our analysis in this paper 
concerns the evolution of the differential from 1994 onwards, however, and we use the socialist 
period data primarily to establish a baseline for the subsequent changes.  Moreover, our findings 
show little fluctuation in the estimated relationships over the entire socialist period, which is 
inconsistent with large roles played by recall and age bias.  To allay any residual concern, we 
provide estimates of the basic functions using least absolute deviations (LAD) in addition to 
ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics, by Time Period 
The stability of wages from 1950 to 1989 is clearly shown in the computations of the 
mean wage, which evolved slowly until jumping up abruptly in 1990-1993, when prices and 
wages were quickly liberalized.  Consistent with aggregate inflation statistics, the mean wage 
increases rapidly through most of the 1990s.  These are nominal wages, but as the cost of living 
also rose in these years, the average real wage certainly fell.  Our concern in this paper is wage 
differentials rather than the overall level of real wages, so in principle our approach of estimating 
repeated cross-sections would seem to require no deflation of the dependent variable.  The 
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significant inflation during the 1990s, however, requires some within-survey-period adjustments.  
In each of the retrospective periods (1950-1993), where there are fewer degrees of freedom (as 
shown in the sample sizes at the bottom of Table 1), we include a quadratic monthly time trend 
in the equation.  In each yearly regression from 1994 to 2000, we include a set of monthly fixed 
effects. 
 The sample characteristics in Table 1 also show an average years of schooling at 9.04 in 
the early 1950s, falling to 8.39 in the early 1960s (possibly due to the Communist regime’s 
active campaign against the intelligentsia), and then rising steadily thereafter, with some 
acceleration after 1990, to 12.19 in 2000.  The increase in years of schooling reflects both the 
increase in the mandatory education during the communist years and the expansion of 
educational opportunities in post-socialist Romania.  Given the characteristics of the 
retrospective data, it is not surprising that the potential years of experience tend to be low during 
the socialist period and until 1994, while afterward the analyzed employees have on average 
around 20 years of work experience.  
 Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for other variables we analyze in the 1994-
2000 period.  The regional and ethnic distributions are relevant for the possibility that 
opportunities for emigration have increased the schooling premium.  Region is defined by 
classifying counties (judete) on the basis of the “development regions” of the National 
Commission for Statistics (2000, p. 601), while the ethnic variables reflect the information 
available in the survey; the means show only minor fluctuations from year to year.  The share of 
employees who have graduated after 1992, which we take as a proxy of post-communist 
schooling (the variable NEW), increased from 0.02 in 1994 to 0.15 in 2000.  The figures also 
show some inter-industry shifts, particularly into service sectors; the figures for agriculture are 
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much lower than from the Labor Force Survey or other official sources, probably because we 
exclude the self-employed.  The biggest shifts concern firm ownership, where the public share 
falls from 0.86 in 1994 to 0.40 in 2000, the mixed rises from 0.02 to 0.10, and the private from 
0.10 to 0.42.  These changes reflect the privatization of the Romanian economy, which if 
somewhat slower than in some neighboring countries, nonetheless changed dramatically during 
this period. 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for New Education, Ownership, Sector, Region, and Ethnicity, 
1994-2000 
 
3.  Estimating Earnings Functions in Romania, 1950-2000 
The basic earnings function we estimate in this paper is the standard relationship due to 
Mincer (1974): 
 ln(W) = β0 + β1S + β2X + β3X2 + β4F + ∑tDt + u, (1) 
where the variables are defined in Table 1, the Dt parameterize time to control for general 
inflation (quadratic monthly time trends in 1950-1993, monthly dummies in 1994-2000), the βs 
are parameters to be estimated, and u is an error term.  Because of some concern about possible 
measurement error, as discussed above, we estimate using least absolute deviations (LAD) or 
median regression, as well as by ordinary least squares (OLS).6  The results from these estimates 
for cross-sections of employees from 1950 to 2000 are provided in Table 3.  
Table 3:  Basic Earnings Functions, by Time Period and Estimation Method 
Under both estimation methods, we find a small but statistically significant impact of 
schooling under central planning:  our estimates show a fairly constant 3-4 percent premium 
                                                 6 As a further check on the influence of possible measurement error, we also estimated the earnings functions with 
samples that excluded that top one percent of earners in each period; the results were similar to those reported here. 
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associated with an additional year of schooling from 1950 through 1989.  The slightly higher 
coefficients in the 1960s might be associated with the industrialization drive that really took off 
in this period and that relied on wage differentials to induce worker mobility in directions desired 
by the planners; or they might reflect a recognition that the repression of the intelligentsia during 
the 1950s had been counterproductive.  At any rate, these movements are very slight compared 
to those beginning in the early 1990s, when the estimated coefficient begins to trend upward 
steadily, more than doubling – to 8.5 percent – by the year 2000.  Throughout the retrospective 
data analysis, the LAD coefficients are much smoother than the OLS, and in particular they show 
a smaller jump in 1990-1993, but from 1994 on there is little to choose between them.  The 
results provide new evidence, based on longer time series than previously available, concerning 
the low “return to schooling” under socialism and the dramatic rise in the return during 
transition.7 
Although not the focus of this paper, the results for the other variables are also 
interesting.  The return to the first year of experience rises in the 1990s compared to the pre-
reform period.  The concavity of the experience profile also tends to increase, consistent with 
results in other countries.  Finally, the coefficient on the female dummy is consistently negative, 
and the magnitude tends to be larger in absolute value in the transition period.8 
Our findings for the schooling coefficient may be compared with those obtained in other 
studies of transition economies.  As we noted above, our paper provides the first analysis of the 
evolution of the wage impact of schooling in Romania from the socialist to the transition period.  
                                                 7 Motivated by the possibility that participation rates of low earners might be falling over this period, particularly 
those of younger people (who might stay in school), older people (who might retire early), and women (who might 
be withdrawing to care for children), we also estimated all equations for the central age-group of 30–50 years old, 
and for men and women separately.  The qualitative patterns in these results are again very similar to those reported 
here.  We also discuss changes in participation patterns by schooling category below. 
8 The widening gender gap in our data is an exception to Brainerd’s (2000) analysis of gender differentials in several 
East European countries (not including Romania), but it is consistent with her finding for Russia and Ukraine.  Why 
Romania should be an exception to the East European pattern is a topic worth further research. 
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Skoufias (2003), however, provides estimates for 1994, and our results for that year are very 
similar to his.9  Concerning studies of other economies that examine the evolution over time, 
Chase (1998) finds a much smaller return during the socialist period in Czechoslovakia but a 
similar figure for 1993 to ours for 1994.  Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell (1999) also report a lower 
return before transition in the Czech Republic, while their estimate of 5.8 percent in 1996 is 
similar to Flanagan’s (1998), and both are slightly smaller than our 6.7 percent estimate for 
Romania.  For Russia from 1991 to 1994, Brainerd (1998) estimates an increase from 3.1 to 6.7 
percent for men and 5.4 to 9.6 percent for women.  For Hungary, Campos and Jolliffe (2003) 
report an estimated return of 6.4 percent already in 1986, rising to 11.2 percent by 1998.  Using 
the same data, Kertesi and Kollo (2002) report that the return to education in Hungary rose 
quickly from 1989 to 1992 but then leveled off.  Our findings differ in showing a steadier and 
more gradual evolution of the estimated return in Romania.  In Fleisher, Sabirianova Peter, and 
Wang (2004)’s summary of estimates of schooling returns across a number of transition 
economies, the mean estimate is about 4 percent in the late 1980s, rising to 8.8 percent in 2000; 
our estimates for Romania are very close to these. 
 
4.  Supply, Demand, and Movement toward Equilibrium 
As this discussion makes plain, the pattern of increasing wage differentials associated 
with schooling has been well-documented in a number of transition countries, and our results so 
far provide evidence of a similar pattern in Romania.  But what factors might explain these 
dramatic changes?  Although data limitations prevent us from a detailed investigation of all the 
possibilities, we are able to provide some evidence relevant to a number of hypotheses.  A first 
                                                 9 Skoufias (2003) measures schooling as a set of dummies for educational attainment rather than years of schooling, 
and his sample differs in several ways (maximum age of 65, restriction to individuals interviewed in 1994), but we 
receive results similar to his when we estimate using attainment dummies with our sample. 
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group of these concerns basic supply and demand analysis: an increase in relative pay associated 
with longer schooling may reflect an adjustment to equilibrium wage relativities, it could be due 
to a contraction in the supply of more educated workers, or it could reflect skill-biased shifts in 
labor demand.  In this section, we consider these broad categories of explanation, before moving 
on in the next section to the specific factors that may underlie relative demand shifts. 
The first group of hypotheses can be illustrated with a simple demand-supply diagram, as 
in Figure 1.  The horizontal axis measures the average schooling in a population while the 
vertical measures the marginal return to additional schooling.  The demand and supply functions 
are expressed in relative terms, the former showing how relative earnings vary with average 
schooling, and the latter measuring the willingness of workers to acquire additional schooling if 
faced with a higher return.  We have drawn the supply function as relatively inelastic due to the 
presumed time lags for workers responding to different incentives. 
Figure 1:  Understanding Changes in Relative Wage (∂W/∂S) and Quantity of Schooling (S) 
Three hypothetical situations are portrayed:  a below equilibrium level of the relative wage at the 
very beginning of transition, labelled W1990; the result of moving to equilibrium with 
simultaneous outward shift of both demand and supply in the middle of the transition process, 
W1995; and the result of further outward shifts, W2000.  W*1990 refers to the relative wage in 1990 
if workers had been paid their marginal products.10  The relative importance of adjustment to 
equilibrium at the beginning of transition can be measured in the diagram as (W*1990-
W1990)/(W1995-W1990).  We approach an analysis of this issue in two ways:  first, we consider the 
temporal pattern of the growth in the schooling coefficient in relation to the liberalization of 
                                                 10 The definition of productivity during the socialist period is somewhat problematic, as the system had different 
goals, prices, and wages; to avoid this confusion we refer to the 1990 situation, when the goals of a market economy 
are assumed, yet wages were still controlled. 
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labor markets in Romania; second, motivated by the possibility of inertial wage setting practices 
for tenured workers, we study the evolution of returns to schooling by cohort. 
The first type of analysis comes directly from the figures in Tables 1 and 3, and we have 
provided a graphical analysis in Figure 2 (using the LAD coefficients from Table 3).  The 
liberalization and adjustment hypothesis would imply a sharp jump in the return to schooling 
around the time of the dramatic policy changes of the early 1990s, followed by a fairly constant 
return in the later years.11  Instead, the figure depicts continuous increases throughout the 1990s, 
with only a small share of the adjustment taking place in any particular year.  The schooling 
coefficient does jump more in the early 1990s than later on, but the continuing upward trend 
would seem to provide prima facie evidence directly contradicting the hypothesis.   
Figure 2: Observed Changes in Relative Wage (∂W/∂S) and Quantity of Schooling (S) 
Perhaps this view is too strict, however, as it is likely that individual workers’ wages may 
respond sluggishly and institutional factors may intervene, particularly in the short run, so that 
the adjustment toward equilibrium takes place only gradually.  In this case, however, it would 
imply that the greatest adjustments would be on the margin:  for instance, younger cohorts of 
workers and those just hired.  For this reason, we also estimate a modified version of equation 
(1): 
 ln(W) = β0 + β10S + β11XS + β12X2S + β2X + β3X2 + β4F + ∑tDt + u , (2) 
which permits the β1 coefficient on S in equation (1) to vary with work experience.  We pool the 
years 1970-1989 together for this analysis and also estimate on the 1990-1993 time period and 
for each year thereafter.  The results for ∂W/∂S, graphically displayed in Figure 3, show that 
initially the schooling wage premium rises more for younger cohorts (β10 is larger) and declines 
                                                 11 See Earle and Oprescu (1995) for a discussion of wage regulations and policies in the early 1990s.  The biggest 
change came in February 1991, when wage setting was liberalized, although some controls continued to be imposed 
in the state sector.  Below, we analyze differences in the schooling wage premium by ownership type. 
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with experience (β12 is larger in absolute value), but in fact the estimated return grows rather 
steadily for each experience group.  By the late 1990s, the profile has nearly converged to a 
profile that is a simple 4 percentage point upward shift of the socialist profile, with little 
difference in shape.12 
Figure 3:  Evolution of the Experience Profile of Returns to Schooling 
 The data, therefore, provide only a little support for the simple “movement to 
equilibrium” interpretation.  In terms of Figure 1, W*1990 appears to differ relatively little from 
W1990, at least compared with the shifts implied by the magnitudes of W1995-W1990 and W2000-
W1995.  Most of these increases must instead be explained by shifts of the relative supply or 
relative demand functions. 
 The possibility that a contraction of relative supply caused the rising measured return to 
schooling is directly contradicted by the increased level of education in the Romanian 
population.  As demonstrated by Figure 2, which portrays the evolution of the average years of 
schooling and the estimated wage premium associated with schooling over the period 1970 to 
2000, the relative supply of educated workers expanded steadily.  The supply-side changes, 
therefore, would have served to reduce, not increase, schooling returns.  The continual 
movement up and to the right in Figure 2 appears to be tracing out the equilibria shown in Figure 
1.13 
                                                 12  Similarly motivated by the possibility of inertial wage setting for incumbent workers coupled with greater 
adjustment on the margin (i.e., for those recently hired), we estimated similar equations for 1994 and 1995 with two 
alternative measures of recent hiring – hired in the previous year and hired since 1991 – based on the job tenure 
variable, which is available for those two years only.  The results were consistent with this motivation, implying a 1-
2 percent greater schooling premium for the recently hired, but this small difference (coupled with the small fraction 
of recently hired workers) is insufficient to account for more than a negligible amount of the growth in the schooling 
coefficient over this period. 
13 We have also examined the evolution of employment-population ratios for three educational groups (S<12, S=12, 
and S>12) and find some tendency for the employment probability to decline more for the less educated compared 
with the more educated group.  Thus, the rise in average educational attainment is higher among employed 
individuals than in the population as a whole. 
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 The relative expansion of skilled worker supply took place at the same time as the 
liberalization of Romania’s borders opened up the possibility of emigration, which may have 
been especially attractive for better educated workers who could exploit the higher schooling 
premium to the West.  Although such emigration clearly did not offset the overall relative supply 
increase within Romania, it is possible that the pressure raised the schooling premium in certain 
groups, those with the greatest tendency to emigrate.  Suppose, for example, that the relative 
supply elasticity is identical for all groups but that the relative demand function faced by groups 
prone to emigrate happens to be less elastic.  In this case, a leftward shift in relative supply of the 
emigration-prone could raise the schooling premium overall, even if the rightward shift of the 
non-emigration-prone was great enough to simultaneously raise the overall average level of 
schooling.  Two simple tests of this argument involve two different ways of proxying the 
tendency to emigrate, the first based on region (distance from the Western border) and the 
second based on ethnicity – Hungarians and Germans, who have enjoyed not only valuable 
language abilities but also preferred emigration status in Hungary and Germany, respectively.  In 
both cases, we rely upon variants of equation (1) involving interactions between schooling and 
the relevant variables:  region in the first case and ethnicity in the second. 
Summary statistics for the region and ethnicity variables were shown in Table 2, while 
the results of the regression analyses appear in Tables 4 and 5.  Concerning variation in the 
estimated schooling return by region, shown in Table 4, the coefficients of interest involve the 
interactions between schooling and the western regions – Southwest, West, and Northwest – 
which are located closest to Hungary and job opportunities in the European Union and thus may 
be expected to have the highest returns.  Contrary to this hypothesis, all these coefficients are 
negative, and occasionally they are even statistically significant at conventional levels.  
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Concerning variation by ethnicity, the coefficients of interest are the interactions of schooling 
with Hungarian and German background, and again the results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that an improvement in the relative opportunities for more educated workers in these 
ethnic groups has effectively shifted their relative supply functions backwards.   
Table 4:  Variation in the Return to Schooling by Region 
Table 5:  Variation in the Return to Schooling by Ethnicity 
 Overall, therefore, we find no evidence of any role for supply shifts in explaining the 
rapidly rising return to schooling in Romania.  Indeed, the large supply shifts we observe would 
imply a decline, not an increase, in the schooling effect.  Furthermore, the increases in student 
enrollments and average worker education imply a still greater reduction in the wage differential 
associated with schooling as long as schooling and ability are correlated, for the expanded 
opportunities for schooling would result in lower average ability at higher levels of schooling, 
lowering the schooling coefficient over this period.  The shifts in relative demand must have 
been large enough to offset these negative effects from the supply side as well as to account for 
the large observed rises in both the quantity and price of educated labor. 
 
5.  Explanations:  Relative Demand Shift Factors 
The evidence so far clearly suggests that the rising return to schooling in Romania during 
the 1990s must be explained by large outward shifts in the relative demand for more educated 
workers.  What factors could have led to the increased relative productivity of more educated 
workers that would underlie such shifts?  A first possibility is an increase in the quality of 
education.  Second, demand could shift due to skill-biased technical change.  Third, even if there 
was little change inside Romania, it is possible that international opening of the economy could 
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effectively raise relative demand, putting upward pressure on skill differentials to bring them in 
line with neighboring countries.  Fourth, product demand shifts across industries – using 
different technologies and therefore providing different rewards for schooling – could produce 
compositional effects in the changes in the estimated schooling coefficients.  Fifth, similar 
compositional effects could occur due to shifts across ownership forms, in particular from the 
state to the private sector, where wage-setting mechanisms are likely to differ significantly.  
Finally, the opportunities for entrepreneurship in the unstable environment of transition could 
increase returns if education is associated with a greater ability to “deal with disequilibria.”  We 
consider each of these possible explanations in turn. 
 The first possibility, improvements in the educational system, can be thought of as 
technological changes to the human capital production function.  This idea has only recently 
surfaced in discussions of rising skill differentials in the West (Bowlus and Robinson, 2004), but 
it has been more common in East European discussions of these issues (e.g., Kertesi and Kollo, 
2002).  A popular view among educators in the region is that the educational system has become 
less productive, the strenuous standards of the socialist system – particularly in mathematics and 
technical fields – having deteriorated under the lax discipline of transition.  If true, this would 
imply a decreased return to schooling, ceteris paribus.  As a crude test of these possible changes 
in the educational production function, we distinguish workers who graduated after 1992 as 
having “new education.”  The means by year for this variable (NEW) are shown in Table 2. 
Our method is to interact NEW with S in another extension of equation (1).  The results 
are shown in Table 6, and they indicate a small premium for post-communist schooling in 1994 
and 1995 of about 2 percentage points.  The estimated coefficient shrinks to 1 percent and 
becomes statistically insignificant in 1996, however, and thereafter is completely negligible in 
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size as well as statistically insignificant.  It is also noteworthy that those with new education 
receive sharply lower earnings (i.e., a lower intercept) in 1994 and 1995, but this difference 
converges towards zero over the 1990s.  In any case, new entrants are clearly not particularly 
highly rewarded in the Romanian labor market during this period, and the evidence does not 
appear to support the hypothesis that improved education has raised the productivity differential 
associated with more schooling. 
Table 6:  Variation in the Return to Schooling by New versus Old Education 
 A second possible explanation for the outward relative demand shift could be skill-biased 
technical change.  The notion that advances in information technology account for increased 
wage inequality has been extremely fashionable in the U.S., but unfortunately it is very difficult 
to measure.  In our data, there is no variable to proxy for computer usage or technology adoption 
by the firm.  Common sense, however, suggests that it is implausible that technology change, at 
least of the conventional sort, is a major factor.  For one thing, the increase in the wage impact of 
schooling is much faster in Romania during the 1990s than in Western economies in the entire 
second half of the twentieth century.  Indeed, as noted by Card and DiNardo (2002), the increase 
in the schooling premium in the U.S. had taken place by 1990, with little change thereafter.  
Even if Romania started transition in a technologically backward state, investment was very low 
through most of this period, so adoption of new technology was probably similarly sluggish.14  
Some direct evidence from firm surveys appears in Commander and Kollo (2004) and Earle, 
Pagano, and Lesi (forthcoming); both studies show low levels of information technology usage, 
and the former shows that adoption is largely uncorrelated with the rise in the skill premium in 
the sampled firms.  Perhaps technological change in a broader sense including not only physical 
                                                 14 The share of investment in GDP, calculated from official figures in National Commission for Statistics (various 
issues), was 29.6 percent in 1989, 14.2 in 1991, 16.1 in 1994, 16.3 in 1998, and 10.7 in 2000. 
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machinery but also new types of organizational practices might be responsible, although these 
are even harder to measure.15  We return to a discussion of such changes below. 
 Another broad category of explanation concerns changes in the composition of the 
Romanian economy.  Research on the increasing schooling premium in the U.S. associates 
sectoral shifts with changes in product demand, and similarly we may consider the rise of the 
service sector and the decline of heavy industry in Romania as reflecting the substitution of 
consumer preferences for central planning in the determination of product demand.  For current 
purposes, we consider shifts across a crude division of the economy into 3 sectors:  agriculture, 
industry, and services.16  The main hypothesis of interest is that the return to schooling is higher 
in the services sector (due, for example, to different technology), so that a rise in services leads 
to a composition of the economy with a higher weight on the wage differential in services.17  We 
again employ an interactions specification, with the results shown in Table 7. 
Table 7:  Variation in the Return to Schooling by Sector  
 Industry is the omitted category; thus the coefficient on S measures ∂W/∂S in the 
industrial sector, while the coefficients on the interaction terms show the difference between the 
return in agriculture or services from that in industry.  The estimates imply an approximate 1 
percent additional premium for schooling in services compared with industry, but this difference 
is small and falls somewhat over these years.  Moreover, the level and growth in the estimated 
                                                 15 Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) argue that the main effect of computerization works through the complementary 
organizational changes accompanying new technology adoption; in this case, however, the skill-bias effect should 
still be correlated with technical change.  This implies that other types of organizational change may be more 
significant. 
16 See Earle (1997) for a more detailed discussion of interindustry mobility of workers in Romania. 
17 The sectoral shares of employees in our data differ from those in official statistics because of large numbers of 
self-employed in both agriculture and services.  If we include self-employed, the shares of agriculture, industry, and 
services in 2000 would be 36 percent, 25 percent, and 39 percent. 
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return to schooling in industry look similar to those for the whole economy.  These results 
provide little support for a major role of sectoral shifts in explaining the rising wage premium.18 
 Another variety of compositional shift concerns ownership types.  As shown in Table 2, 
the Romanian economy underwent dramatic changes by ownership during the 1994-2000 period, 
with a substantial decline in the fraction of workers reporting their employer was state-owned 
(from 86 to 40 percent), and corresponding rises in the fraction private (from 10 to 42 percent), 
mixed (from 1.8 to 10.5 percent), and an unknown “other” (from 0.2 to 5.5 percent).  Our 
motivation for studying these ownership forms is the possibility that they differ in organizational 
practices, due to legal regulations, firm objectives, or corporate governance.  These practices 
may result in deviation of relative wages from relative productivity ratios of workers within a 
firm.  The specific hypothesis is that private firms – placing a higher weight on profits, feeling 
more pressure from market competition, and facing harder budget constraints – are less likely to 
provide such rents to low-skilled workers than the state sector.  We provide evidence on this 
hypothesis with a test analogous to those above, namely by adding to equation (1)  interactions 
of ownership type with schooling.  State ownership is the omitted category. 
 The results, presented in Table 8, imply a statistically significantly higher schooling wage 
premium in privately owned firms.  Interestingly, the estimated magnitude follows a roughly 
inverted-U trajectory, rising from 1994 to 1996 and falling thereafter.  This difference in wage-
setting behavior in the private sector, combined with the rising private share in total employment, 
may partially account for the overall growth in the aggregate schooling return.  The contribution 
is not large, however:  the private sector added about 0.2 percentage points to the aggregate 
                                                 18 A similar analysis with 15 disaggregated industries also finds no indication that interindustry shifts in employment 
could contribute significantly to the rise in the coefficient overall. 
 
 20
return in 1994 and about 0.7 in 2000.  Meanwhile, the estimated return in the state sector grows 
by 2 percentage points (from 5.7 to 7.7, as shown in the table). 
Table 8:  Variation in the Return to Schooling by Ownership of Employer 
 Our findings suggest that, contrary to a number of hypotheses, the rise in the wage 
premium for additional schooling was both gradual and broadly based.  It was not concentrated 
in only some sectors of the Romanian economy but affected all sectors without many differences 
among them.  The fact that the private sector appears to have led the increasing trend is 
suggestive, however, as it implies that changes in organizational practices may be part of the 
story. 
 What sorts of organizational practices could be relevant, and what changes in the 
economic environment could have brought them about?  One possibility is raised by recent 
research on skill differentials in the U.S., which maintains that the effect of technological change 
works through organizational practices to raise the relative productivity of more skilled workers.  
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), for instance, point to the ways computers have enabled practices 
such as flexibility in equipment design and job assignments, lower levels of inventories, more 
outsourcing, more participation in decision making, and flatter hierarchies.  But we have argued 
that the rising skill differential in Romania (and other transition economies) took place much 
more quickly than can be explained by investments in new technologies and the even slower 
adoption of such practices. 
Our final hypothesis, therefore, concerns a different set of practices that involve 
particular types of skills and tasks:  finding creative solutions to problems, recognizing and 
exploiting new opportunities, innovating rather than simply following orders.  The socialist 
system provided workers and managers with few incentives to display individual initiative and 
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exercise these qualities.19  Not only were many economic decisions prescribed by the plan, the 
stability of the system meant that there were few gains from searching for new opportunities; 
innovation and exceeding the plan targets could even be penalized, for instance through the 
“ratchet effect.”  In the transition, however, the abilities to think “outside the box” and to act 
entrepreneurially became extremely important, probably even more so than in stable market 
economies.  If education increases these abilities to “deal with disequilibria,” as argued by 
Schultz (1975), then the relative productivity of workers with more schooling will rise. 
 The problem is how to measure or provide some evidence on this effect.  We do so 
indirectly, by analyzing the returns to schooling among the self-employed.   For this purpose, we 
consider the nonagricultural self-employed as entrepreneurs, as they are typically treated in the 
literature on this topic.20  Comparing with our estimated coefficient for employees, if we find a 
similar or lower schooling coefficient for self-employed, then this would imply a rejection of the 
argument, while finding a substantially higher coefficient would be consistent with it.  The return 
to schooling among entrepreneurs might be expected to first rise and then fall, as the scope for 
exploiting new opportunities initially rises (as liberalization increases and the opportunities are 
revealed) and then declines (as the opportunities are exhausted). 
Defining and measuring the income of entrepreneurs is always a difficult problem, but in 
the case of the IHS a special section of the questionnaire provides unusually detailed and precise 
information:  gross revenue from entrepreneurial activities, capital inputs, material inputs, labor 
costs, taxes, and in-kind payments – all with respect to the reference month.21  We define net 
                                                 19 One should not entirely discount the usefulness of creativity in solving such problems as the supply breakdowns 
endemic under central planning; the assumption here is only that the scope for and return to exercising creative 
initiative were greatly attenuated compared to a market or transition economy. 
20 See, e.g., Evans and Leighton (1989), Fairlie and Meyer (1996), or Hamilton (2000).  Consistent with most 
literature, we omit the agricultural self-employed from the analysis as they are less likely to be genuine 
entrepreneurs, particularly in Romania, where the land privatization policy resulted in tiny family farms. 
21 In-kind payments, which would mostly refer to crops given to workers, are available only in 1994 and 1995, but 
they would represent subtractions from gross revenue in later years.  The use of data for a reference month is 
somewhat problematic, but we have little alternative with the data available. 
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income as the first variable minus the sum of all the others and use this as the dependent variable 
in the conventional earnings regression (1).  Table 9 presents estimates for the sample of 
nonagricultural self-employed, aged 15-59,  in the IHS from 1994 to 2000. 
Table 9:  Return to Schooling for the Nonagricultural Self-Employed 
 The estimated coefficient on S is larger for the nonagricultural self-employed than for 
employees in all years.  The coefficient grows strongly until 1998, when it peaks at 15.5 percent, 
and then declines somewhat thereafter.22  The pattern is not due to changes in the supply of 
individuals engaged in self-employment, as the fraction of total employment accounted for by 
the nonagricultural self-employed steadily expanded, cumulatively nearly doubling (from 3.58 to 
6.03 percent) in just six years from 1994 to 2000.23 
These results are consistent with the proposition that education plays an important role in 
enhancing the ability of workers to deal with disequilibria.  We believe they shed light not only 
on the self-employed, but also on the increased return to education among employees.  
Employees may also be involved in entrepreneurial activities, in the sense of recognizing and 
exploiting new opportunities.  If education enhances the ability of the self-employed to act 
creatively, then it may be inferred that it has a similar effect for employees as well.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper makes a number of contributions to research on the growth in the estimated 
return to schooling during the transition from socialism.  Ours is the first paper to examine the 
changes in the return for Romania, a relatively large country in Eastern Europe that has been 
                                                 22 Studies of these relationships in other countries have found varying results:  Gill (1988), Borjas and Bronars 
(1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), and Fairlie and Meyer (1996)  find a higher return for self-employed, but Rees 
and Shah (1986), Earle and Sakova (2000), and Hamilton (2000) find the opposite. 
23  The fraction would of course be much greater if we followed the convention of calculating the rate in 
nonagricultural employment:  the relevant figures for 1994 and 2000 in this case would be 4.7 and 8.3 percent, 
respectively. 
 23
somewhat neglected by researchers.  Our paper is also one of very few to contain information for 
long periods during both the central planning and transition years:  we analyze 40 years and 11 
years of data for the two periods, respectively.  Our estimates of basic earnings functions in 
Romania reinforce previous research findings from other countries that the schooling wage 
premium was low under central planning (although our point estimates, at around 3-4 percent, 
are somewhat larger than those for the Czech Republic and smaller than those for Hungary, for 
instance) and that it grew substantially during the transition years – more than doubling in our 
analysis of Romanian data through the year 2000. 
Our paper also goes beyond estimating the schooling coefficient to assemble evidence 
concerning a number of explanatory hypotheses for the observed patterns.  We first investigate 
the conventional explanations for an increased schooling premium in Western research, 
including relative supply shifts, product demand shifts, and skill-biased technical change.  The 
rise in average schooling in our data is inconsistent with an overall contraction in supply of more 
educated workers in Romania, and the lack of evidence of higher returns for workers in the West 
and for ethnic groups with better emigration possibilities (Germans and Hungarians) leads us to 
reject any role for border liberalization in putting upward pressure on the schooling differential.  
Our analysis of interindustry variation in estimated schooling returns provides no evidence of a 
significant impact of product demand shifts.  The possibility of skill-biased technical change is 
difficult to measure and cannot be completely discounted, but the much faster pace of increase in 
the measured schooling return in Romania compared to the West and the very low level of 
investment during the same period undercut the plausibility of the large or exclusive role 
assigned to this factor in many studies of Western economies. 
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We therefore consider a set of additional hypotheses that we derive from a broader 
understanding of Romania and other transition economies.  First among these is the possibility 
that the increased return reflects a movement from centrally planned determination to an 
equilibrium in which relative wages more closely reflect relative marginal products.  While again 
we cannot unequivocally reject this hypothesis, which has dominated most previous research on 
returns to education in transition economies – at least implicitly – the rather gradual pace of the 
growth in returns throughout the 1990s, even among new cohorts of recently hired workers, 
provides evidence against a dominant role for this factor. 
The results of our analysis also challenge interpretations based on improvements from the 
socialist to the transition period in the quality or value of formal schooling.  We find neither that 
education received during the socialist period lost value when market reforms were introduced, 
nor that newly acquired education after 1990 was consistently valued much higher in the labor 
market.  Indeed, while of course the share of the work force with “new education” steadily 
increased through the 1990s, the estimated return is significantly larger than that for “old 
education” in 1994 and 1995, and the difference is negligible and statistically insignificant 
thereafter.  Nevertheless, the overall return to education continued to steadily increase. 
Our analysis does find support, however, for a category of explanations that has received 
little attention in the literature:  organizational and institutional changes that increase the value of 
education.  The two main pieces of evidence for this hypothesis are the greater wage effects of 
schooling among private sector employees and among self-employed entrepreneurs, both of 
which grew substantially in their share of Romanian employment over this period.  The 
differential in the return averages 1.8 percent for the private sector and 5.0 percent for 
entrepreneurs, and the evolution of both displays a pronounced inverted U-shape over the 1994-
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2000 period.  Our interpretation of these results is that the adoption of new organizational 
practices, particularly the higher rewards for individual initiative, increased the value of 
education within the private sector, while the possibilities of exploiting new opportunities did the 
same even more so among entrepreneurs.  The state sector, meanwhile, was itself gradually 
commercializing, undergoing organizational change, and experiencing increased labor market 
pressure to conform to the wage differentials in the growing rest of the economy.  The inverse U-
shape reflects the leadership of private sector and entrepreneurial returns in pushing the more 
sluggish state sector in this direction, as well as the gradual exhaustion of great opportunities for 
dealing with the disequilibria of economic transition. 
 The analysis we have carried out provides support for these interpretations, but the data 
are insufficient to refute or substantiate them entirely.  Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude by 
reiterating some important caveats about our work.  We should again emphasize that our analysis 
suffers from the standard problems in studies of “returns to schooling” in that we observe only 
wages, not other economic or psychic benefits from work, we do not observe costs of acquiring 
education, and we cannot control for self-selection in individual educational choices.  The 
transition context may particularly aggravate the first two of these problems, as fringe benefits 
and work conditions changed drastically as did individual variation in schooling costs, with the 
entry of new private educational institutions and the introduction of the practice of charging fees 
to some students even in state organizations.  Concerning the third problem, we may take the 
acquisition of schooling-based skills under central planning as exogenous to earnings during the 
transition, particularly under our argument concerning the large increase in the value of the 
ability to deal with disequilibria.  Thus, the transition context may partially ameliorate this 
standard problem. 
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We should also emphasize an important caveat about our analysis of earnings functions 
prior to 1994, which are based on retrospective questions asked of respondents in 1994.  As 
always, questions about the reliability of such data may be raised, and the results should be 
treated with caution.  Indeed, the relatively low R2 that we obtain in most of the pre-1994 period 
certainly suggests the possibility of higher measurement error during this period.  To avoid 
mistaken inferences, we estimate our equations on a variety of samples, including eliminating 
outliers, and we use LAD as well as OLS estimation methods.  All the results from these 
different approaches show great stability in the estimated schooling coefficient over the entire 40 
years, which suggests that mistakes in answering the retrospective questions are not leading to 
systematic biases. 
A final caveat concerning measurement problems applies to nearly all the hypotheses we 
consider for the observed pattern of increasing return to schooling.  Lack of information prevents 
us from undertaking a more thorough analysis of schooling quality, product demand shifts, and 
technical change, for instance.  We do find little evidence supporting major roles for these 
factors, but further analysis based on better data would certainly be useful.  Concerning the 
evidence we find for our hypothesis that the transition involves an increased value of education 
in dealing with disequilibria, data limitations again prevent us from measuring important factors 
such as creativity, innovation, and initiative.  Our findings of higher returns to education in paid 
private sector work and in entrepreneurship cannot be considered decisive, but we find them 
highly suggestive of the value of education in a disequilibrium period full of opportunities. 
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Figure 1: Understanding Changes in Relative Wage (∂W/∂S)  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, by Time Period 
Note:  W is net monthly wage (thousand Romanian lei), ln(W) is the natural log of W, S is schooling (years), X is potential experience (years), F is female dummy, and N is the 
number of observations.  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses (for continuous variables). 
 
 
 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
      
W 0.63 0.61 0.76 0.97 1.25 1.71 1.90 2.11 16.00 133.59 192.78 287.35 513.36 857.80 1231.38 1938.38 
 (0.96) (0.34) (0.47) (0.77) (0.67) (5.00) (3.04) (1.55) (27.27) (72.82) (98.71) (163.38) (310.14) (484.83) (658.47) (1142.07) 
                 
Ln(W) -0.76 -0.63 -0.46 -0.21 0.11 0.32 0.53 0.65 1.96 4.77 5.15 5.53 6.11 6.63 7.01 7.44 
 (0.69) (0.52) (0.65) (0.63) (0.50) (0.51) (0.43) (0.39) (1.28) (0.50) (0.48) (0.51) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) 
                 
S 9.04 9.40 8.39 8.61 9.23 9.91 10.62 10.88 11.18 11.37 11.43 11.76 11.89 11.99 12.09 12.19 
 (3.70) (3.88) (3.62) (3.52) (3.29) (3.29) (3.21) (2.79) (2.49) (2.87) (2.78) (2.60) (2.56) (2.52) (2.50) (2.41) 
                 
X 4.48 6.35 10.88 12.52 12.50 12.34 11.09 9.95 8.91 20.26 20.21 19.81 20.10 20.14 20.17 20.08 
 (4.22) (5.51) (6.70) (8.41) (10.05) (11.11) (11.19) (11.19) (9.55) (10.42) (10.30) (10.15) (10.04) (9.95) (9.83) (9.74) 
                 
F 0.27 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 
                 
N 459 609 854 805 1237 1339 1676 2606 1228 25565 23644 23919 15508 21518 18963 17486 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for New Education, Ownership, Sector,  
Region, and Ethnicity, 1994-2000 
Note:  Regions are defined on the basis of National Commission for Statistics (2000, p. 601).   
 
 Definition 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Region         
BUCHAREST  0.127 0.112 0.113 0.116 0.108 0.112 0.113 
NORTH-EAST  0.134 0.137 0.133 0.132 0.135 0.130 0.132 
SOUTH-EAST  0.123 0.123 0.121 0.122 0.126 0.126 0.114 
SOUTH  0.153 0.151 0.155 0.148 0.149 0.146 0.145 
SOUTH-WEST  0.105 0.106 0.103 0.104 0.106 0.107 0.114 
WEST  0.093 0.096 0.096 0.094 0.098 0.093 0.096 
NORTH-WEST  0.135 0.144 0.139 0.144 0.141 0.145 0.152 
CENTER  0.130 0.132 0.142 0.140 0.137 0.140 0.133 
         
Ethnicity         
ROMANIAN   0.922 0.919 0.915 0.916 0.916 0.917 0.912 
HUNGARIAN  0.063 0.068 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.074 
GERMAN  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
ROMA  0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006 
OTHER  0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
         
New education         
NEW graduated after 1992 0.019 0.034 0.059 0.078 0.098 0.122 0.147 
         
Ownership type         
STATE state 0.864 0.806 0.753 0.705 0.622 0.481 0.404 
PRIVATE private 0.100 0.149 0.184 0.224 0.268 0.343 0.423 
MIXED mixed 0.018 0.029 0.048 0.057 0.094 0.119 0.105 
COOP cooperative 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 
OTHER other ownership 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.042 0.055 
         
Sector of employer         
INDUSTRY industry 0.446 0.432 0.441 0.436 0.419 0.408 0.410 
AGRIC agriculture 0.085 0.085 0.074 0.068 0.063 0.057 0.047 
SERVICES services 0.469 0.483 0.485 0.496 0.517 0.535 0.543 
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Table 3:  Basic Earnings Functions, by Time Period and Estimation Method 
 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 OLS 
S 0.031 0.024 0.047 0.046 0.039 0.042 0.043 0.034 0.064 0.059 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.078 0.082 0.085 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
X -0.003 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.020 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.036 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.032 0.027 0.026 0.031 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
X2/100 0.048 -0.102 -0.050 -0.066 -0.051 -0.019 -0.018 -0.030 -0.061 -0.030 -0.034 -0.042 -0.051 -0.039 -0.037 -0.049 
 (0.104) (0.048) (0.043) (0.039) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.170 -0.115 -0.278 -0.183 -0.147 -0.147 -0.116 -0.126 -0.159 -0.215 -0.216 -0.231 -0.217 -0.197 -0.185 -0.216 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.050) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R2 0.043 0.054 0.144 0.120 0.085 0.091 0.108 0.096 0.537 0.247 0.254 0.296 0.267 0.308 0.295 0.312 
 LAD 
S 0.027 0.030 0.041 0.038 0.033 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.048 0.056 0.065 0.068 0.065 0.075 0.079 0.083 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
X 0.009 0.021 0.001 0.012 0.018 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.025 0.034 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
X2/100 0.083 -0.100 -0.007 -0.026 -0.043 -0.022 -0.009 -0.015 -0.041 -0.034 -0.034 -0.039 -0.053 -0.037 -0.036 -0.054 
 (0.102) (0.052) (0.028) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.120 -0.091 -0.192 -0.058 -0.144 -0.131 -0.103 -0.091 -0.097 -0.194 -0.211 -0.224 -0.223 -0.193 -0.180 -0.206 
 (0.066) (0.053) (0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.047 0.054 0.043 0.057 0.085 0.072 0.063 0.435 0.154 0.154 0.173 0.156 0.179 0.173 0.185 
N 459 609 854 805 1237 1339 1676 2606 1228 25565 23644 23919 15508 12518 18963 17486 
Note:  Dependent variable is ln(net monthly wage).  N is the number of observations.  For the period 1950–1993, a quadratic monthly time trend is included, and for the period 






Table 4:  Variation in the Return to Schooling, by Region 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S 0.065 0.074 0.080 0.076 0.082 0.084 0.092 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
        
S*North-East 0.001 -0.003 -0.011 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
S*South-East -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
S*South -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
S*South-West -0.008 -0.006 -0.023 -0.011 0.000 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
        
S*West -0.011 -0.012 -0.020 -0.016 -0.005 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
        
S*North-West -0.003 -0.003 -0.015 -0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
S*Center -0.007 -0.011 -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
North-East -0.112 -0.097 -0.001 -0.182 -0.105 -0.106 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.051) (0.070) (0.051) (0.060) (0.064) 
        
South-East 0.165 0.130 0.131 0.084 0.041 -0.028 0.055 
 (0.039) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061) (0.051) (0.058) (0.066) 
        
South 0.098 0.085 0.079 0.090 -0.024 -0.058 -0.063 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.047) (0.063) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065) 
        
South-West 0.061 0.017 0.211 0.064 -0.063 -0.076 -0.104 
 (0.049) (0.056) (0.054) (0.073) (0.058) (0.065) (0.071) 
        
West 0.135 0.147 0.203 0.123 -0.038 -0.031 0.122 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.062) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062) (0.073) 
        
North-West 0.031 -0.027 0.111 0.034 -0.042 -0.210 0.062 
 (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.062) (0.051) (0.057) (0.063) 
        
Center -0.013 0.049 0.097 0.123 0.049 -0.029 0.131 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.048) (0.062) (0.050) (0.056) (0.066) 
        
R2 0.256 0.262 0.304 0.276 0.314 0.305 0.318 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Regions are defined on the basis of National 
Commission for Statistics (2000, p. 601).  The equations also contain the other variables shown in Table 3 
and monthly dummies to control for general wage inflation.  Other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 5:  Variation in the Return to Schooling, by Ethnicity 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S 0.059 0.067 0.068 0.070 0.079 0.083 0.087 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
        
S*Hungarian -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 -0.004 -0.020 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
S*German -0.007 -0.012 0.008 0.007 -0.043 0.002 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.026) 
        
S*Roma -0.024 -0.030 -0.022 -0.013 -0.037 -0.052 -0.039 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) 
        
S*Other -0.037 -0.018 -0.029 -0.015 -0.035 0.000 -0.024 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
        
Hungarian -0.027 -0.058 0.011 0.116 0.066 -0.009 0.172 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.048) (0.070) (0.050) (0.063) (0.063) 
        
German 0.065 0.102 -0.107 -0.118 0.514 -0.083 0.162 
 (0.141) (0.154) (0.164) (0.255) (0.265) (0.200) (0.305) 
        
Roma 0.018 0.125 0.140 0.092 0.224 0.475 0.336 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.076) (0.095) (0.118) (0.097) (0.163) 
        
Other 0.420 0.239 0.331 0.202 0.398 -0.056 0.266 
 (0.135) (0.126) (0.131) (0.216) (0.156) (0.162) (0.153) 
        
R2 0.249 0.256 0.298 0.268 0.309 0.297 0.314 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The equations also contain the other variables shown in 
Table 3 and monthly dummies to control for general wage inflation.  Variables are defined in Tables 1 
and 2. 
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Table 6:  Variation in the Return to Schooling, by New versus Old Education 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S 0.059 0.067 0.068 0.069 0.078 0.082 0.086 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
        
S*NEW 0.021 0.022 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
        
NEW -0.352 -0.357 -0.215 -0.100 -0.172 -0.127 -0.083 
 (0.114) (0.085) (0.073) (0.074) (0.054) (0.049) (0.051) 
R2 0.248 0.255 0.297 0.267 0.308 0.295 0.312 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The equations also contain the other variables shown in 




Table 7:  Variation in the Return to Schooling, by Sector 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S 0.055 0.062 0.066 0.067 0.076 0.080 0.084 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
S*AGRIC 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
        
S*SERVICES 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
AGRIC -0.229 -0.194 -0.159 -0.269 -0.273 -0.240 -0.212 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.043) (0.056) (0.049) (0.054) (0.069) 
        
SERVICES -0.208 -0.237 -0.275 -0.266 -0.229 -0.123 -0.190 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) 
R2 0.261 0.275 0.327 0.296 0.332 0.306 0.326 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The equations also contain the other variables shown in 




Table 8:  Variation in the Return to Schooling, by Ownership of Employer 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
S 0.057 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.072 0.075 0.077 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
S*PRIVATE 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
S*MIXED 0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
        
S*COOP 0.028 0.011 0.016 0.048 0.004 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
        
S*OTHER 0.046 0.013 0.011 -0.008 -0.049 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
PRIVATE -0.257 -0.251 -0.339 -0.338 -0.282 -0.271 -0.269 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) 
        
MIXED -0.036 -0.056 0.065 -0.026 -0.029 -0.023 0.088 
 (0.075) (0.063) (0.057) (0.076) (0.049) (0.048) (0.059) 
        
COOP -0.638 -0.445 -0.520 -0.839 -0.320 -0.216 -0.283 
 (0.099) (0.116) (0.147) (0.190) (0.146) (0.149) (0.179) 
        
OTHER -0.733 -0.361 -0.350 -0.226 0.295 -0.029 -0.169 
 (0.223) (0.153) (0.215) (0.264) (0.245) (0.071) (0.069) 
R2 0.258 0.264 0.308 0.278 0.322 0.303 0.325 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The equations also contain the other variables shown in 





Table 9: Return to Schooling for the Nonagricultural Self-Employed 
 















R2 0.158 0.181 0.223 0.237 0.265 0.234 0.239 
N 801 789 1310 861 1441 1492 1548 
Note:  These are coefficients on S (with standard errors in parentheses) from estimation of 
equation (1) by year for the nonagricultural self-employed respondents in the IHS. 
 
